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The maln source of lnllatlonary

pressures and thi naln source ol
destabtliatlon olthe exchange and
,ntel€st rales has been the budget
delicit, which has been increasing
at an unsustalnable pace slnce
1990. Slablllilng the econony will
require a signilicant and sustalned
budget surplus and no addltlonal
domesilc bank borrowlng. lt will
also rcquire a liberallzatlon ot

What is less understood by the public

is the underlying cause of

the

worsening macroeconomic situation,
which is the locus ol this presentation,
The root cause of the worsening
macroeconomic crisis has been the

from theil1992 level and expenditures
jumped 4 percenhge poinb as a share

excessively expansionary lircal
policies pursued since late 1990.
Large and growing fiscal deficits,

To linance the budget gap, the

financed primarily by recourse to the
domestic banking system, contributed

lorelgn exchange and credlt

to a substantial increase in the money

markets.

shck, which in turn intensified demand
pressures in both the goods and the

A.

foreign exchange markets.

Overuiew

To properly understand the current

dramatically in 1993 to 1 7.5 percent of
GDP, when revenues fell by almost 5
percentage points as a share ol GDP

Every year since 1990 has been

of GDP.

government should have cut
expenditures. lnstead, it soug ht
recourse from several sources of
financing, but, given the magnitude of

financing needs and structural
constraints, borrowing from the
banking sector, and especiallyfrom he
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN),
became the major source of linance.
Accordingly, credit from the banking
system to tre federal governmentgrew

heated

characterized by a huge federal

debate among scholars, politicians,
labour and business people over the
most appropriate policy course to

expenditure expansion, in the face of
shrinking revenues. After a surge in

stabilize the economy, it is essential to
properly understand what happened in
he recent past.

prices resulting from the Gult War,

percenton average peryear from 1990
to 1993. ln 1993 alone, theflow of net

tederal revenues returned last year to

credit from the monetary sector to the

federal government, most of which
extended directly by the CBN, was a

economic indicators in Nigeria. ln
contastto tre period of robustgrowth,
moderating inflation, and improving
external conditions in he late 1980s,
mounting fnancial imbalances have
been responsible lor an acceleration

their 1989 level as a share of GDP,
while federal expenditures exploded
from about 15 to about 31 percent of
GDP. A similar tend can be detected
after adjusting nominal figures for
inflation (Table 2.'l shows the same
tends in real terms in the last section
oftre table, where nominalvalues are
divided by the consumer price index

in inflation and exchange

lo derive constant price estimates)r.

of the money stock in the years 1990

macroeconomic crisis and

fie

The years since 1990
witnessed a worsening in

have
most

rate

depreciation, a slowing oJ real GDP
growtr, and a substantial weakening

of the country's external position.
These are facts that are visible to us
all (and need no reminder to you).
The papet was yesented

j

at he

Seminat

1991 due to the increase in crude oil

Not surprisingly, given the diverging

huge amount, equivalentto 13 percent

ol nominal GDP or 76 percent ol the
stock of (broad) money at the
beginning of'1993.
This huge borrowing by the federal
government was responsible directly
forthe 330 percent cumulative growth

to

1993 and indirectly for

its

trends in revenues and expenditures,

devastating effects on inflation and

eveiy year since 1989 has been

cunency depreciation.

marked by an increase in the lederal

budgetdeficit. Thegapwidened

most

lot Joumalisls on ke Nigetian Ecanony at Gateway Hotel

Throughout this papet, real values are obtained

in nominal terms by a stunning 228

W dellating noninal

Sango

Let us, then, turn to a closer
examination of the behaviour of the
Ok, Ogun StaE, Nige a on Novenbet 17,1994

values by lhe CPI index (FOS Nationt! Consumet Ptice lndex, annual aveages)
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Table 2.1: Budgetary and Macroeconomic Trtnds, 198G93

1985 1987 1988 1989 t9m t99r 1992

t993

F€der.l Budg€a Out-tutu
(PeEeat of GDP)
Ravanuar

Nood.bt Exp..diru&.
Priri.ry B.l.ncc
Intlra3t Duc
Ov.r!ll 86lsncc
Nct Foreign Firuncing

C.nt6l Bank Fin o.int
oth!, Domcsric Fi ncing l
Ch.!8e io tbe Mooey Supply[2]

(*

E,.chatr8e Rat€s

Omcill

l1.l

13.1

19.9

20.6

It.7

13.9

12.6

10.6

5.0

t2.t

t1 .4

21.0

6.6
4.9

2.6

0.5

I1.3

10.0

7.6
r0.4

3.3
9.8

1.7

-t.?

-9.5

8.7
9.1
-1.0

15.6
3.1

-2.'l

{.5

o3

3.2

{.5

-1.7

t.1

4.0

6.0

3.3

2.6

9.7
0.4

E.l

-9.2

3.6
-2.9
0.3

-0.1

4.5

3.7
5.2
0.6

-0.1

1.t

lt.5

-7.1
10.4

-t.4

-t7.5

St-2

7.1

51.9

of CDP)

To{.1
Extcnded to Fcdcnl Gov.mment
ExEndcd ro Privrrc S€cror I3l

Nominel

t5.2

t.9

2.7 27.7 4X.3 6.1 ,to.o 33.t

Aanual Percent Changc

9ock of Credit

15.5

3l.t
B.l

50.3

3t.5

3t.3

20.5

19.2

26.t

19.7

lt.9

t.0

7.4

24.2

1t.t

19.4

12.5

ll.t

7.365
r0.810

8.038

9.910

t7.29t

22.65

9.610

13.265

21.070

31.260

22.5
10.0
12.5

26.t
15.2
10.9

t.?

N/g)
t.155

4.016

4.537

Nominrl Prr.llcl

4.020

4.730

6.t70

Bodry Ligbt Elporl Prte (Us$/bbl)

14.66 1t.93

Parceo( Chatrge
Inflltion Rst€ (Avcrage)

5.7
3.3

Rcrl Inlcre( Rrr. (Deposit) [4]
Reel Oflicirl Erchange Rlte (N/t) I4l

n.4
1.6

la.t

l5.l

I

1t.50 24.16 20.59 19.93

tt.24

54.5
-26.8

4.2

7.4

t2.1

u.6

51.2

I1.5

2.2

-18.0

-19.7

-21.5

7.t

7.4

I1.6

x.9

-tt.4

50.4

l.

Itrludcs crcdit! f.om commcrciel bantr, mcrchlnt brnt!, non-brnt inlrirutions, .nd
bonowing from 6{.te .nd locrl govcfirment federrrion .ccount distributioB.
2. ChuSe in $ock of mon€y and qu.si-rnoney.
3. Stock ofcEdit .xr€ndcd to lhe p.ivrt! sector plu! orhcr non-fcdenl public s€ctor cnrities

4.

B.scd oo chugcr in the consumer pdc. index.
of
Fedenl Ofiice of Strtinica IMF and et!frcstimates.

Sourccr Fcicrll M

levels depend

examine the linkage behveen the

on export earnings, as
there is no cushion provided by

the exchange rate, the sustained
increase in the official naira/dollar

government's bonowing requirement

reserves or external bonowing. Thus,

exchange rate explains why petroleum

and the mounting inflationary

customs duties also depend on
pekoleum revenues. This heavy
dependence has exposed federal

revenues doubled from 1990 to 1993
despite their lall in dollar terms. But
sincethe devaluation ofthe naira over

revenues to changes in world crude oil
prices, oil production and exports, and

this period barely compensated for
inflation, total revenues fell both as a

the exchange rate. Following their

share of GDP and in real terrns.

main culprit, fiscal policy. Later, we will

pressures. We will then conclude with
a few remarks asto the required policy
actions to bring back macroeconomic
stability and spur economic growth.

B.

1990 peak in the aftermath ol the Gulf

After distribution to all tiers of

Revenues
ln total, almost 90 percent of total
revenues are tied to petroleum either

War, oil prices have continuously
declined. This has been only partially
compensated by an increase in the
volume of oil exports. As a result, oil

government and specialfunds from he
lederation account, he lederal govern-

directly or indirectly. Petroleum rev-

reve.nues in dollar terms lell every year

independent revenues, plus resources

enues have systematically accounted
lor more than 80 percent of revenues.

since 1990, although they remained at
a higher level than in 1989 (See Table

diverted from the lederation account
(such as the ones flowing into the

Customs duties and excise taxes
account for another 8 percent to 10
percent of income. However, import

2.3)

ication accounts). Notice that
when the additional resources now
diverted from the federation account

4o

Fiscal Policy, 1989-1993

With narra revenues depending on
boh he dollaramountof reven ues and

ment keeps a share determined by a
Iormula (cunently 48.5 percent), plus

ded
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are taken into conslderation, the
elfective share of the federal

53 percent in 1993, despite all diver.

5 percentol GDP in 1989 to 21 percent

sions through the dedicated accounts,

government retained revenues out of
total collection is much higher tran the
nominal 48.5 share. Also note that in
this presentation, unlike in the CBN or

the stabilization accounts and other
leakages. This was due in part to the

in 1993. ln real terms, measured in
constant 1987 prices, it quintupled

government's publications, revenues
are inclusive of all diversions.

Federally retained

reve

nu

es

growing demands of the lower tiers of

from 5 billion naira in 1989t0 25 billion
naira. Much of this growth was lueled

government and the consequent
adjustment during the period under
consideration in the nominal

by extra-budgetary spending which
rose from 15 percent of total
expenditures in 1989 to 53 percent in

distribution shares.

1993.

followed a similar pattern as mentioned

above. They increased from 14 to 20
percent between 1989and 1991 asa
share of GDP, but by 1993 they had
fallen back to their '1989 level. In
addition to the Gulf War, a contributing

lactor has been the fall in the effective
share of federally collected revenues
accruing to the lederal government,
from about 60 percentin 1 991 to about

Expenditures
It is useful to look separately at the

hends in expenditures exclusive of
debt service charges (that is, expenditures on goods and services). The

most striking feature is the rapid
expansion of non-debt expenditures,
particularly exfa-budgetary spending.
Non-debt spending quadrupled lron

ln Table 2.4, extrabudgetary
spending (the difference between
budgeted and total actual
expenditures) has been assigned to
the various categories <.,f spending,
when possible. The residual is
"unidentified
classified

in

expenditures", which remains a very
large share of total, underscoring the

lack of transparency not only in the

Table 2.2: Federal Revenues and Expenditures; 1939-1993

Itr Biliols of Currcrt
Fcdcr.Uy

Rctlinri

I989

r990

1991

Ch!ngc
Cr pc.iod)

1992

r993

1989-1993

N.i.r

Rcvcnucs

31.5

56.6

69.7

99.1

107.4

35.9

33.9

64.3

9l.t

143.5

242.0

63.5

lntErcd Du.

22.4

29.5

33.1

60.t

80.1

37.

Non-Dcbt Expcnditurcs

I1.4

34.t

5t.7

82.7

161.9

2.4

7.7

22.r

44.4

134.6

t3.1

19.9

20.6

lt.7

13.9

14.7

22.6

?7.t

31.4

lntcrEd Duc

9.7

lo.3

9.t

l t.5

10.4

Non-Dcbt Expcndinrrcs

5.0

12.2

.dcrrl Expcdiulrts

Defici(

94.1
I

?3.8

In perceot of GDP
edc.llly Rctlin€d Rcvcnues
Expendirurcs

17.4

15.6

21.0

1.0

6.5

E.4

t7.5

Fcdcrrlly R.tlirEd Rcv.nucs

13.5

24.t

24.4

16.8

5.6

Expcrdilrrc.

14.6

25.t

35.3

37.9

27.0

Int!l!.( Duc

9.7

I1.8

ll.8

15.0

12.5

6.1

Noo-Dcbt Exp.ndinrres

1_9

t4.0

20.9

20.3

N.4

50.7

1.0

3.1

7.9

10.9

2t.l

117.7

Itr Billiols of 1987 N&in

:

Fcdcnl Minis&y of Firuocc , Fcdcrd OfEcc ofst ti.ticr rrd r.tr c{inr.&s

4t
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budget documenb, but also in final
accounb. Although this is a very

important issue related to liscal
management, his paper is confined to
macroeconomic
the topic

of

managEment.

Domestic interest more than
doubled in real terms beMeen 1989

was equivalent in 1993 to about 39
percentolfederally rehined revenues.
ln any case, a large part of these

burden of external debt payments,
interost payments due have actually
decreased as a share of total
expenditures, hlling from 66 percent
in 1990 to 33 percent in 1993. this
was due in pafl to tte ra6id expansion
of elGa-budgetary spending, arid in
part to the over-valued official

obligations have not been paid, due to

rescheduling agreements or
accumulation

of

anears.These

sources of financing are reflecbd in our

presentation as part of external

Table 2.3: Structure of Government Revenu€s, 1989-1993
r989

Itr Bilioo! of Currlol

1990

19,1

l99!

1992

N.in

Fcd.6lly Collccted R.vcnucr
PctDleum

cudom. rnd Excirc

t12.7

rqt3

t

15t.6

55.9

94.1

ll3.l

4.7

79.1

94.6

5.t

t.6

It.5

16.l'

15.1

5.4

f .il

139.

lnland Rcvanuar

1.9

2.4

3.t

Indcp.rdcnt Rcvcdca

1.4

3.5

t.2

t2.2

9,5

3t.5

56.6

69.7

99.1

LUI.4

Pctoleum

t3.6

t4.l

t3.7

t0.5

t2.l

Customs and Excisc

10.4

9.2

l0.l

9.3

t.l

3.4

3.0

3.4

3.1

4.9

2.t

7.0

4.9

F.dc6lly R.t iod Rcvcnuc.
Shere

io Federe& Collected

X,eveouce

2.5

lndcpcndcnt Rcvcnucs

Petcedt

C[.!8e troE Prdiou! Yect

Fcdcolly colLrlcd Rcveou..

t9.4

6t.,1

20.2

52.7

ll.9

Paltolcum rcvcauaa

97.1

69.3

19.5

$.9

l4.l

20.6

19.9

It.2

Mcoo lt€os
Nomirul Bonny P.icca ($/B)
Oil

Muctior

Pctrol€um Rcv.nuc! ($

oftcill

I E.5

(MMBD)

billio )

Exchln8c Rlie (Av. N/S)

1.6t3

t.E3t

1.954

1.96t

2.67

6.4

9.8

9.5

t.0

1.2

t1.1

22.6

54.1

53.3

7.37

Efrcctivc Sharc, Fc.dcrally Rctrin d Rcvcoucs

55.2

t.04
5t.6

9.91

60.5

sourc.s: F.dcnl Minirtry of Fiuocc ard Sted.dimrtcs.

and 1993, as tre domeslic debt stock
grew rapidly due to finance growing
annual fiscal deficib. However, muctt

exchange rate. Foreign inbrestdue
(in naira) remained roughly conshnt
from 1990 t0 l992 butdeclined in 1993

he domestic inbrest is an inta-government transfer because the bulk
(trree quarters) of domestic debt is
held by he Cental Bank ol Nigeria
(CBN)
popular
Conkary
perception wih respect h he growing

by about 27 percent'in real terms
because of he real apprechlion of he
otficial exchange rate. When

of

to

'?

'zThere are no

Mounl)

42

lot

a

measured as a share ol revenues (so

as h reduce he effect ol ex&ange
rate valuations), foreign interest due

ears on domestb interest odigAions, as the CBN has routinely

alltte arnounl

due.

fi

nancing, belolvtte' de{cil' line, unlilo

CBN and government's presenhtions,
which are on a cash basis.

You should be aware hat official
reporling of he fiscalaccounb, based

on cash accounting, ignores the
arrears problem and the consequences on he balance sheet of the
governm€nt. Let me give you a quick

debild the Euhteasury's enunt

(in

patlculat, tlle Ways and Medts
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Table

2.4: Structure of Federal Expenditures,

1989-1993
Average

Gror{tb
(h pelleot)
1989

h

1990

l99l

1992

1993

l9qLl993

Billiotrs of Curreot Naira

Totll Expcnditu&.

33.9

64.1

9l.E

t{3.5

242.0

Du.

n.1

29.5

33,t

60,t

t0.l

37,4

l. Don do

6.0

t.5

10.5

u,e

3t,7

59.3

15.4

21.0

22,6

36.0

41.3

26.0

l.ia

34.t

5t.7

12.1

161.9

94. t

7.6

10.3

12.7

15.6

41.3

52.6

11.0

t2.9

r6.t

21.1

30.5

29.0

1.1

-aa

E8.4

A.l .tltt

2. Bxt rnd
B. Notr-f,)cbt E

l. Prinur,
2. ceir.l

p.rdituilt

Rccumcrt

3. Prc-SFEM

PryrF

!

I

1.9

1.5

1.1

4. Unidcdif;d

-9.1

10.2

2t.0

43.3

Ofwhich: Enm-Budgchry

4,9

26.2

56.6

95.4

Shsre ia

r25.t

Tohl Expeoditur€s

A. lntcrcst Due

66.3

45.8

36.0

42.4

33.1

l.

Domertic

l?.8

t3.2

ll.4

17.3

16.0

2.

Ext!.

48.5

11 1

24.6

N,I

l7.t

33.7

54.2

64.0

51.6

66.9

22.5

16.1

13.4

10.9

I

32.5

20.0

It.3

14.1

t2.6

t

B. Non-dcbt

l. Prirury
2.

63.5

Recu.rerl

clpitel

3. Pte-SFEM Paymcnrs

5.60

?.1

1.8

1.9

0.7

-21.0

r

5.8

30.4

30.2

36.5

14.5

40.1

61.6

66.5

52.6

Totll Expeoditurcs

14.6

25.t

32.7

35.3

37.9

A. htctest Due

9.7

lr.t

1t.t

l5.0

t2.5

6.1

2.6

3.4

6.1

6.1

23.7

4. Unidentifien
Ofwhich:

Exlra-Budgetary

Ia Billioos ol 1987 Nain

l.

Dom.stic

2. Extemrl

7.t

B. Non-Debt Expendiorcg

4.9

1. Primary RecunEnt

3.3

'

c.pit l

r

E.4

8.0

E.9

6.5

4.0

24.9

20.3

u.4

4.t

4.4

3.E

6.5

21.0

50.1
l

t.5

4.V

5.2

6.0

4.8

o.2

3. Pie-SFEM Plymenl!

0.8

o.5

0.6

0.1

0.3

-24.1

4. Unidenlilied

-3.9

4.1

9.9

10.?

13.8

(NA)

Of which: Extr!-Budgetrry

2.1

10.5

20.1

4.5

19.9

75.4

2.

Srrurcc: F.dcnl

Miridry ofFiilncc.nd Sl.ff eslinutcs.
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easier in Nigeria than oher cub, witl
dramatic consequences on he quality

GDP estirnate lor the exchange rate
differential, pub the debt to GDP ratio

and availability of these essential
services. From the macroeconomic

at 122 percent.

point of view, he case for downward
flexibility of expenditures resb on he

very high, even trough Nigeria signed
a rescheduling agreementwitt off cial

bilateral credihrs

shol l00

very €vidence of recent fiscal
behaviour: precisely because

as revenues, 150 in expenditures (50

spending has increased in such an

reduction agreement with commercial

on goods and 50 on interest

uncontollable way,outside he budget
proc€ss or of any lorm of monibfng

banls (he London Club) in early 1992.

illustation of this. Suppose that he
government receives 100 in revenues
and hat he interest due is 100, on a
debt stock of 1000. The government
only pays 50 olthe interestobligations
and spends 50 on goods and services.

Fiscal accounb on an accrual basis,
as in our prese ntatio n, would

obligations) and a deficit of 50, Below

the line (the "deficit" line), this
methodology would show a financing
in the form of accumulation of arreas

of 50. That also conesponds to an
increase of he governments debt, as
ttre unpaid interest should be added
to the oubhnding debt stock at he

beginning of the period. Official
accounts, however, would show no
trace ol such an increase in liabilities.

They would show revenues of 100,
expenditures oI 100 (50 on goods and
50 on interest obligations) and a
balanced budget. You can easilysee
how this way of reporting the fiscal
accounh paints a misleading picture
ol he government's fiscal shnce.
A largefraction ol expenditures are

discretionary and thus relatively
flexible. There are litde stuctural commitmenb in non-debt spending. Since

there are no automatic indexation
mechanisms in public sector wages,
trc governmenthas a large degree of
contolon fie efiecb ofinflation on he
public sechr wage bill. This option,

and control, it is unlikelY that'any
economic rationale iustified these
additional expenditures.

Delicil Flnancing
The gap between revenues and
expenditures widened lrom 1 percent
ot GDP in 1989 to more than 17

percent in 1993. To finance this
increasing delicit, the Federal
Government mostly resorted to
bonowing from he Cental Bank (see

External debt service due remained

(he Paris Club) in
1991 and a debt conversion and

Aa Table 2.4 shows, net external
linancing befora new accumulation of
anears, i.e.he dillerence between he
required repayment ol principal and
tre ombination of cashflow relief and
now monoy, was almost alwaYs
negative (including interest due,
scheduled payments on external debt
were always negative on a net basis).
Thus, he governmentcould not count

in reoent years on this source to
finance ib fiscal deficib.'

Hoqever;

in most cases

government paid only

Table 2.5).

a

the

fraclion of debt

service due and accumulated anears.

Extelnal Debt: Nigeria is

a
severely indebted low income counry,
a hct whictr sharply resticted and will

continue to restrict its bonowing
capacity in international capital
markeb. Among neighbours, Niger
and Ghana are in tris same category,
but most otrer West African counties
are a notch or two above tris lowest
category. lndonesia ho, although it
remains a low incomecounty, belongs

The accumulation of arrears to all
praclical purpses amounb to a lorced
loan from external creditors, financing
scheduled paymenb. Anears on botl
principal and interest payment are

hst

approadingtre US$ billion markand
have akeady caused a virtual drying
up ol any new prolect financing lrom
expofi creditand offter agencies, even
for very profihble proiecb. Also, as
mentioned above, arrears wih respect

indebbd category, When valued

to interest obligations also add to he
oubhnding debt stock.

wages have fallen dramatically - and
are now being bid up, partially in

external debt to GDP was 80 percent

Domestic Non-bank Botrcwlng:

in 1993, though it had averaged

The Government has rearely resorted

response to a series of stikes in 1992.

around 100 percentin the previous five
years3. A better estimate, converting
ttre external debt in Naira athe market

to non-bank domestic bonowing. On
the one hand, bond and money

exchange rate, including interest in
anears and correcting partially the

Nigeria. Their lack ol depth may have

however, has been over-utilized in

he

past with harsh consequences. Beal

Likewise, real cuts, i.e. less than full
adjustment for inflation, in spending on

social programmes, education or
healh have sometimes been politically
3The

a notch higher, in the

moderatelY

athe
oflicial exchange rate, the ratio of

dtq ol20 percentage point shows again the anificia@ ol the offEia!exchange rute: nei letdkJ
econmy gtow W 20 percent.

markets are not well developed in

tE ertemaldebtla

in

dollT not db the Nigeian
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the

inter€st rat6 ceilings at a level mudr

was negative, baking creditwas even

government's bonowing attempts. On

below prevailing market rates and
inllition. Positive real rabs of interest
(that is, higher rates than inflation)
would have been required for the
capihl markeb to meet at least in part
the government's large financing
needs, but even a move toward less
negative rates proved to be

larger than the deficit on an accrual
basis. As Table 2.6 also shows, the

the other hand, money markets
received a boost from the CBN's 1992

move to open market operations
(OMO) as part ot its monetary policy
operating procedures. With liberalized

interest rates, the newly created
discount houses found it attractive to

CBN remained by far the largest
creditor of the Federal Government.
As a direct counterpart to the huge

expansion of banking credit to the
federal government, the money stock
(in its broad aggregate, M2, which

Table 2.5: financing of the Deticit, 1989-l993ei
ro*1h
(in percat)

C

t99l

t9ti9

t990

2.4

1.7

22.r

44.4

t14.6
13.2

1992

1993

1990-1993

lo Bilioos of Curreot Naire
Fiscal Deficit

offte F.dcml Co"ernmen&/

160.0

E.2

-0.3

{.5

-9.0

9.4

7.8

7.4

9.1

r2.0

-2.t

-20.6

{.6

-57.t

44.4

46.2

0.9

12.5

-1.2

3t.9

65.6

13.7

-5.8

6.1

l3.t

48.1

I16.4

166.7

Banting Syrtem

-9.3

2.t

t2.t

46.8

9't.5

221.t

Non-Blnk Crcdit

3.4

3.4

1.0

1.3

0.0

l.t

8.7

5.3

Dcficit

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Exterod Firuncing

343.9

-3.3

-2.1

-20.3

L-orn Drawings

394.t

1c2.3

33.4

20.6

8.9

Repayment! ner of Debt Rclief

-86.3

-269 -2

-30.0

-r28.5

47.9

Enerrul Fimncing
t

oln Dnwings

Rcplymenb ner of Debt Rclief
Changc6 in Arrelrs
Ne( Domestic CrEdit

Bormwing/Tnnsfcrs fmm Strte &
Io Pett.ot of the

lrcll

Govcmments

I

t5.2

t.8

71.6

5.0

41.5

llef.it
t

00.0

9.t

36.1

163.6

-5.5

t7.6

4E.t

Ncr Domesti. Credit

-243.9

80.1

62.6

108.4

86.5

Brnking System

-387.6

36.1

58.1

105.5

't2..5

t43.7

43.9

4.5

2.9

14.0

39.5

I1.9

3.7

Changes in Arrea6

Non-Bank Cr.nit
Borrowing/Transfcn from State

& Locll

Governments

0.0

Excludes outst nding liabilities ro domestic lnd cxemll contnctors lnd vcndors.
UThe m*sure ofthe deficit used herc follows IMF m€thodology. Foreign debt items 6nt rec, principsl rcpayment rnd
disburscments) !r€ presenred on !n rccrulls basis. Domesric items rre on ! clsh basis.

d

Sourcc: Fed€ral Minisrry ofFinancc lnd Sllffestimares.

build a portfolio o{ teasury bills, on
which OMO are basbd. This allowed
a one-trme major increase in non-bank
bonowing in 1993 (see Table 2.5).
Timid attempts by the CBN to shift (at
least partially) the burden ol financing
the growing liscal deficit away trom he

monetary sector and onto the nonbank public and institutions were
crashed in 1994 by the reimposition ol

unacceptable as a policy option.

Domestic Bank Borrowing: So in

addition to building up arrears,
borrowing from the monetary sector
has become the major source of
findncing of the growing deficits. As
Table 2.5 shows, fre share ofthe defictt
fi

nanced from banking credit grew Irom

includes currency in circulation and
checking and savings deposits in the
hands of fre public) grew in nominal

terms by a total ol 330 percent
between end '1989 and end 1993, or
150 billion Naira, despite a relative fall
in credit to private sector and other
public entities and sharp reduction in

36% in 1990 lo 72.5 % in 1993. ln

net foreign assets (net reserves) in

1992, because net external financing

1992.

5
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There are hree main forces dnving
the expansion oI the money stock. ln
Nrgeria, credit to the federal govern-

ment, net of government deposits,
grew by 1 60 billion between '1990 and
1993. The stock of credit to the gov-

billion naira, from '12.5 percent of GDP

in 1989 to less than 9 percent in '1993.

This, and otirer residual items in the

balance ol the monetary sector,
contributed negatively, by 10 billion
naira, to the cumulative growth of

1

994

by the huge bonowing requirements
of the lederal government.

C, lmpact ol lhe Monetary
Expansion on the Main
Macroeconomic lndicators
The sharp increase in

he stock of

ernment was equivalent to only 7.4
percent of GDP in '1990. By 1993, it
was equal to 23 percent. The role ol

The relative fall in the stock ofcredit

the fiscal deficit, produced a dramatic

to the private sector reflected several

deficitfinancing in expanding the stock
of money is clearly seen from Figure

attempts by the Central Bank to try to
counter the monetary expansion by

acceleration of inflation, Consumer
price inflation rose from 7 percent in
1990 to 57 percent in 1993 and 62

money supply.

Table

2.6:

money, driven by the need to finance

Federal Domestic Debt by Holder, 1989-93
1989

l9q)

57051

42160
3t391

r99r

1992

1993

84093

ll62m

150956

26tt4l

65837

96939

130414

228754

56564

t94r3

t23E70

189773

9273

7526

65.{3

3t980

19261

20543

393t7

27086

7836E

26.4C"

23.4%

24.5%

7.9%

5.1%

t0.2%

Nein Milioos
DoEestic

Bt

by

Crtditor

A. Toill B.nting lcctor

l.

Ccntrar

blnk

2. Commercial and Mcrchlnt

Blnls

3769

B. Non-blnk scctor

14891

M€oo:

1E660 27529 267tt

Non-Cenral Baol

I

E256

In Peneot of GDP
Ccot.sl Brnk

16.7%

Non-Centnl BsoL

8.t

Sourcc: Centfrl baot of Nigcria rod

{.ff

t9.a
9.7 %

cadmlks

reserves held by the banking system)

curbing banks' credit to the private
sector. For example, starting in 1990,
the CBN forced commercial and
merchant banks to hold so-called

he money stock

stabilization securities (in addition to

by about 21 billion naira lrom end 1989

unchanged or higher reserve and
liquidig requirements)4. Commercial
and merchant banks also increased
their holdings of treasury bills in 1993
through open market operations byhe
CBN.s Overall, though these efforts
produced noticeable crowding out of

2.1.

The net eflect of changes in loreign

assets holdings (loreign exchange
was roughly to reduce

to end 1993. Think of it as additional
sales ol foreign exchange by the
banking system out ol their reserve
holdings, which imply net purchases
of naira from the public by the banks,
thus a reduction in the money stock.
Credit to the private sector and

oher public entities declined by

38

percent by end-June 1994 (SeeTable

2.7). lnflationary pressures also
caused a massive depreciation ol the

parallel exchange rate and large
increases in interest rates, althouEh
nominal interest rates lagged behind
the rising inflation.
Money Growlh and lnflation
There may be drfferences of opinion

on the relative importance of factors
that explain short-lerm variations in

the private sector, they were swamped

inflation, but there is no doubt that the
most important factor behind high

their impact on monehry aggregates

inllation rates is the rapid expansion

in

1ln19,forcedholdingsofstabilizationsecuriliesanountedtoN28.5billion,comparcdtoN17.7billionin1992andN7.8billionin1991.
sThis increase in voluntary increase in holdings ol T-bills by commercial and merchant banks does not (necexarily) rellecl a reslrictive nonelaty palicy: on

lhe one hand, the operations ol the otlicial toteign exchange maket induced some ol the denand lor T-Bills W bank; on the othet hand, the banks
have (wisely) restricted lhei overall supply of ctedit to the ptivate seclot because of the deteiorating political and maaoeconomb envionnen[
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Figure 2.1: Money Groxth and Budget Deficit
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Table 2.7t Sources of Money Gror+th, f 9E9-1993
Curulrtive
r989-1993

l99r

1992

r993

In Bfiotrs

63.5

85.0

r24.5

t95.2

149.t

54.7

76.r

197.9

2t.0

33.9

t3t.2
t0.7

245.0

18.3

17t.2

160.0

2t.9

x3.6

42.3

57.5

66.8

37.9

23.1

44.t

58.8

3t.t

59.9

36.E

-24.t

-36.0

49.9

-48.5

-109.1

-t4.9

20.3

3.4

-54.4

9.E

:20.9

6.1

40.0

33.t

51.2

51.9

330.1

-15.3

16.0

39.2

&.6

11.2

419.t

ofwhich: Fcde.rl Govcnunent -33.7
ofwhich: Othcr Public/Privlle 2,7

l5.l

61.0

13E.3

120.8

t75.2

16.5

25.7

36.1

l6.l

131.5

126.2

93.7

1t.2

-33.9

54.4

159.2

7.7

44.5

38.8

-r1

126.1

34t.4

1989

1990

Money plus Qu.si-Morey

45.4

A. Net Domesric Credi(
of which: Fcderrl Govemrlcnt

41.1

Itr Billio6 of Curreda Nrire

of which: Othe. Public/Pdvat
B. Nei For€ign AsseB

(l)

C. OGer Items Net

cro*ih)

(Cont.iburion ofForeign AsscB to Money
ChrnSe f.oor

krvioos Period in Perreot

Qu.si-Moncy
A, Net Domcrtic Crcdit
Mooey plus

8. Net Forcign Asscl.s
C. Olhc. Itcms

(l)

Net

(l)

Chrogcs in the srock of ner fo.eign .sscG .rc duc ro changes in bolh the aock in forligll currEncy .nd lhe
.xchlogc nte; thc rnclsurc of the contribulion of forcign !ss.l! to moncy 8ro*1h corrrcB for chrrl8e3 in
thc valuation ofbcginning-oflcriod foreigo asscB sirrcc thcs. chlngcs hlvc oo rnonclrry i.nplct

Source!: CcntEl Brnt of Nigcri. rnd drfiestinutes
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about 330 percent and real GDP grew
by 19 percent, prices, as measured by

carried out at a rate set by the Federal

the CPI index, grew by over 175

recognized parallel market, fed by non-

percent. Figure 2.2 clearly illustrates
that the relation between money and

oil export earnings and remittance and

Empirical analysis of real money
demand in Nigeria has shown that it

prices has been skong in Nigeria.

banking and Bureaux de Change
systems, the exchange rate was

grows roughly with real income and

importanl, are perceptrons about future

that it is sensitive to the reJative

macroeconomic

opportunity costs of holding money
versus other assets (real or linancial
domestic assets and foreign assets).

Cunent inflaton may be due not solely
to current excessive money growth but

Beal income has grown

deficits generating excessive money
growth. Thus, to control inllation once
it gets above a moderate range, the
government must not only return to
fiscal discipline, but also establish
credibility in being able to maintain

of the stock of money. Usually, the
average price level grows at the rate
by which nominal money supply
growth exceeds real money demand
growth.6

only

moderately in the last few years. The
opportunity costol holding money has,

if anything, increased. Thus

real

money demand increased moderately

Equally important,

il not more

ma

nagement.

also to expectations of continued fiscal

Government. ln the olficially
capital inflows channelled through the

market-determined.
The parallel naira/dollar exchange
rate increased steadily from 1989 to
1993, by almost 290 percent. The
official rate in turn had to be adjusted
several times over this period either by
resorting to market mechanisms or by

government decision.These adjustments were both unavoidable and
desirable.T When the government

It should then be clear that there has

Iiscal discipline.

been alarge degree of excess money

lnflation and the Exchange Rate

supply growth and that we should
expect the rate of inflation to track
money growth. This analysis predicts
correctly why prices incre ased
dramatically over the four years from

Until 1993, Nigeria operated a dual
foreign exchange market system. ln

resisted such adjustment, the gap
between the market and the official
rate (the foreign exchange premium)
widened. In 1993, the government's
decision to marntain the official naira/

the official market, public sector trans'

dollar rate at a fixed level while inflation

actions, as well as official sales to the

private sector of government foreign

continued (and even accelerated), led
to a real appreciation of the official

1990 to 1993:while money growth was

exchange from oil earnings, were

exchange rate by over

or not at all over

he period 1990-1993.

Table

cPl

2.E: Inflation, Exchange Rates and Interest

lndex (Annual Average, 198?= 100)

lnflation Rat€

1989

l9q)

1991

t992

1993

249.5

2

406.5

63E.E

50.4

1.4

t2.7

44.6

57.2

7.36

E.04

9.91

17.30

22.0-l

Nomiul chrnse (%)

62.1

9.1

23.3

14.6

27.6

Rerl Chrrge (%)

?.1

7.4

I1.6

25.9

-18.4

Ollicial Exchrnge Rate (Annurl AverlSe, N/$)

Prrallel Exchanse Rsle (Ainurl Averlsc, N/S)

Nomi.ul Chlnge (j6)
R.c.t Ch.nge

Forcigtr

(*)

Erct{rgc PEmium

ln r.i

R.rE (Atrdrd Avc.Ec.)

ThtE.
L

Mdh Di*dd

Rrtc

Ex-Fo. R..l Di*ood Rrr.

l0.t I

9.61

13.29

21.07

37.26

5?.4

-ll.t

3t.2

58.6

76.t

3.9

-t2-5

25.1

14.4

l3.l

46.t

19.6

34.1

2l.t

6t.9

rt.5

It.5

r5-5

t7.5

-21.2

t0.3

2-5

-1t.7

sourcc: Fcdc!.1 officc of s6tuaic., ccd.rl B.nt of NicFri

percent and

Rates

2i2.4

.l

'18

-o

-r9.t

.d drftcrim.t .

ln a flexiAe, qen, mafuel xonomy ( wheker developed or developing), most real fetots, such as devaluations, rcmoval ol subsidies or inttoduction of
new taxes, droughts in agicultural areas, etc. should not have pefinanent inflationary ellects il they are not accompanied by excess noney growth, as they
simply anount to translets ol noninal income lrcm one sector to another.
/
The nominal officiel rate was adjusled upwards
out 175 percenl frcn 1990 until Apil 1993, but has supce been lxed at iE Ntent le!'el ol 22 Naira per U.S. do at

u

by
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- R...l Exchange Rates: Nigeria and Indonesia

Figure 2.2

Real Exehange Rate lndex - Ouarterly
(1990

=

10O)

1.6
1
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,,1
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7
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o.4
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1

1

1
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tr
+

Nigaria
lndonesia

2.2.

to an increase in the premium from an

shown in Figure

(A "real"

As you can see, Nigeria has not

average of 22 percent in 1992 to an
average of 70 percent in 1993. The

exchange rate compares not only the
number Naira per Franc or per Dollar,
but also the purchsing power of those

done well in maintaining a stable real
exchange rate compared to lndonesia

IMF has estimated that between March

1992 (when the adjustment in the
official rate narrowed the gap with the

Naira, Francs and Dollars.) A similar
graph could have been produced for

parallel rate for a few months) and
December 1993 the real effective

Nigeria and Korea or Nigeria and
Singapore, but lndonesia was chosen

official rate had appreciated by 60
percent, while the bureuun rate had
remained broadly exchanged in read
effective terms (that is, when 60
compared to Nigeria's main trading
partners an adjusted for relative

because, as an oil exporter, it has
experienced the same price shocks positive and negative - as Nigeria. Yet

since 1970 lndonesia has gone from
having a per capital income slightly

(or any of the other East Asian
countries). Over time the effects of

these differences in policies
accumulate. ln 1970, neither
lndonesia nor Nigeria exported an
appreciable amount of manufactured

good. Nigeria still does not,

but

lndonesia in 1 992 66% of exporbwere
of manufactured goods.

The increase in the parallel

inflation trends).

lower than Nigeria to having and
income about double Nigeria. The

exchange rate was just a symptom of
inflation. The parallel exchange rate

We can draw an interesting contrast
between these policies in Nigaia and
policies in the very successful East

importance of maintaining a stable real
exchange rate at a realistic level is trat
this gives investors confidehce to plan

is a price

Asian countries;' Consider the

on making money by exporting or by
producing import substitutes trat really

price of a U.S. dollar, or the price of
pound sterling. lf there is inflation, i.e.
if there is a general increase in prices,

compete wih imports.

there is no reason why market

difference in the "real" exchange rate
in Nigeria and in lndonesia since 1g86

like other market prices: it is

the price of foreign exchange, e.g. the
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exchange rates should

remain

160 percent, fueled by

aproprtional on paper (when considering' for

underlying expansionofmoneyjupply.
-The
short-run ielation between
pr.r*r"..-r6porsible for pushin[

,r.t'..i.0
iii..,

The same

of gooO. up - in ttre'case

a

oi

m. nr.at itetcit - will push depieciations of tre market exchange
rate may cause temporary bursts
,r.trLng. rate up as well. ln
sense, inttition expiains tre largest inflation. However, tre way to avoid
p.rt J tr. it"t.tt of tre market frice making hese temporary pressures
.l0.8
naira inflati-on permanent is to avoid
of the U.S. dollarratefrom

t.

fV,

t, doll., in 1989 h 37.3 naira in
1993.
From 19g9 to i9g3, he terms of

percent
due in pa* to,a fall in real oil prices.

Uade deteriorated by about I3

.f.o rrpfain

p.*.t irti..*

a

partolhe

245

i, he'paraflel nairal
insfuc'tive

However, ii is

bolar rate.
to note trat, between 1986 and

oher

tre gains from alternative uses of he

of allocated foreign exchange, including
roundtipping " trat the opprtunity
on cost)' There are several examples in

his

to

inL..ii

c-osts such as interest charges or

less.legitimate charges to obhin a
inflation and he exchange rate is
complexone. lnheshortrun,sudden specialallocation;orwhenconsidering

[iig;*,t'iron.dryexpansionand,
,iti",nrt

example., out'of'pocket additional

is,

recent Nigerian macroeconomic

growh.

history of large adiustmenb in the
officialexchang_eratehatdidnotlead
To the public, it may appear
1986'fte
tosignificantinflalion:inlate
inflationwascausedbyexchangerate
rate was adlusbd
olficial
depreciation, buttre reality is hat,
.exchange
it not been for tre growtr in money uryvqds by almost 300 percent' but
supply, only some prices would have inflation remained low until he 1998
risbh, whi6 oher prices would have fiscal and monetary expansions'
lnversely, trere are also examples of
had h
This pint applies to bo$ marlat: large inflation unaccompanied by
accommodation by monehry

that

had

1989,

decline.

Figurt 2.3: Money, kices end Exchange Rates
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the terms of trade improved by 7
percent. Yetthe parallel exchange rate
also increased, this time by over 170
percent. ln both cases, inflationary

Monay

------a-

cr, o)

cPt

--*-

determined and fixed rate regimes
without rationing. But it applies with
even greater strength when the official

Exchlngc Ratc

official devalualions: '1993 is an
obvious example ol inflation in a period
ol constant official exchange rates.
With stong inflationary pressures in

the economy. virtually no foreign

nominal depreciation: in both periods,

exchange rate is accompanied bY
massive rationing, which implies that
the true cost of a unit of loreign

domestic prices increased by above

exchange is higher than what appears

capacity, the lixing of the official

pressures were the main source of

50

exchange reserves and no borrowing
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'8
exchange rate b,y he government can
necessarily leads t0 rationing by com-

shyawayfrom tre bankirq ry*emand
move heir funds to investnenb trat

mittees, witr all ib attendant maladies

provide some potec.lion from inflation,

fiat Nigeria has experiencrd on more
than one occasion in tre last ten yearc,
lnstead, the only effective way to
stabilize he value of he currency is to

sudr as real eshte, commodilies, or
foreign exdrange.

eliminate
is,

he

causes of inflation,

hat

frst, excessive moneygrowtr. This

can only be achieved by ending direct

governmentborrowing from he banking system. An addlional tactor pufing

uprard pressure on he exchange rate
has been he flightfrom Naira to hard
currencies, reflecting expecbtions of
a worsening

plitical and economic

situation and more atfaclive returns.
abroad. Capihl flight per seis only a

oftris phenomenon and you
should not harbor he illusion that it can
symptom

be stopped or reversed by gorarnment

fiat.

Here too, only a credible

resolulion ofthe undertying causes will
be effective.

lnlerest Bates
Throughout most of the period,
nominal interest rateb were on he rise
in parallel with the accelerating
.inflation, but ex-pst real intered rates
decreased. By 1992, hey had turned
negative (see Table A8), as the
increase in nominal inbrest rabs was
overwhelmed by the prevailing
inflation. the interest rabs quoted in
the table applied to government
instruments and were not market
debrmined, but ofier inbrest rabs,
such as commercial bank deposit and'

lending rates, were also negative in
real terms in recent years, trough nol
as negative as government rabs. The
ills ol negatirc rates of interest are also

Flscal Mlsmanagemonl and Growth
Ovenall, for he fu ur years

fom I $10
to 1993, factors ouEide tre full confol
of plicy makers (such as oil prices
fluctuations, international currency
markeb' volatility or

he oukomes

of

debt negotiations), have not playrd an
important role or a role ftat could not

be eflectively counteracted by the
appropriate macroemnomic plicies.

Macroeconomic mismanagement,

byt'r growing politcal ins'tabilirty,
has been the main source of
macroeconomic problems. lt is,
indeed, hard to imagine how any
aided

investor or business decision maker
can rely on economic calculations of
risks and opprtunities in such an
onvironment
though sound macro policies are
only a necessary and not a suffcient,
ondition br good economic pertorm-

dpamic
pdt/ab
and vibrant
s€cbr in Nigeria
would have grown much hster witr
good macro plicies. Thus, if the
priwb Nigerian economy ould haw
sushined rates of grolvfi of say, 6
ance, I am convinctd ttnt he

percentper annum under$able macrc
policies wer he last four years, h6
totial macroeconomic cosb of fiscal
mbmanagement ov€r he same perbd

could be estimated at roughly.10
prcentof 1993 GDB orover 80 billion
naira in1993s.

D.

demand exceeds available supply;

RequlredShort-TormActlons
he short term, fie goals of fiscal
'monetary
policies should be
and
stability in domestic prices, inbrest

nancial disintermedialion, as savers

rates, and exchange rates. These are

well.known: credit rationing, as
fi

M

U.S. ptic€E did nol incaase

'lf ln

rate of grwttt

hd

ln

also necessary ondilion

1

9S4

br adrieving

high long*un growh rates in GDp. A
crediHe $abilization program reguires

he immediate elimination of fre ororall
deficit and strict confol of monetary
aggregates so as to bring inflation
down to an international level, and
liberalization of interest rates and
exchange rate.

tie
he

lf he Nigerian governmentwanbto
resbre a viable and rational foreign
exchange regime, trere is no choicr
but b liberalize tre market The level
of reserves is insuffcient to delend a
fixed exdrange rate and rationing has
bear repeabdly proven inefieclirc and
inefficient, except as a source lor
onuption and tansfer of rents. The
liberalization of tre foreign exctange
marlotwill reduce he pemium on he
parallel exdrange rab, reshre competiliveness to he naira, oncouftlge
expoft and pimb capihlinflols, and
restrain import demand wifiout fie
need tor administrative rationing.
Libenlizalion does not mean hat he
gorrernmentwould lose fo abilityb influence he rab. h only requires ftat
he government respect fie laws of
dernnd and suppf. Being a netseller
of loreign exchange lo he private
seaor, he Nqedan gowrnment will
mainhin the ability to inffuence he
exctnnge rab hrough he amount of
bforeign exdrange sabs.
the recent fuel pice inoease can
govide a sizeable amount ol new
rovenu€s b $e gwernmenl (more
than 45 billion naira annually), which
can help in reducing he deficit, il hey
are not sp6ot on additional
programmes. llowever, eliminating
he overall deficit witrout hking any
oher new revenue measures would

still require an exEaordinary reduc{ion
in expenditures, more than 80 percont

ntdt.

ben I pe@rn, e.Etimdd

aosts

wotM anomt to s0 Nrcent ol

1998

GbP 0t
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lif,t Naita.
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in real terms, more than is imaginable

demonstrated commitmerrt to fiscal

and feasible. Thus, the inescapable
conclusion is that additional revenues

and monetary stability.

he
necessary expenditure cuts to a
feasible range. While this is not $e

G,Summary
The macroeconomic situation has

must be raised in order to limit

deteriorated severely over the last few
years. The deepening ofthe crisis can

lorum to discuss reve n ue-raising
options br tre government, hey would

be seen lrom virtually anY

not be limited to new taxes.

macroeconomic indicator. lnflalion has

ln the short-run, a large potential
source ol revenues is lrom the sale of

accelerated sharplylrom the low levels

recorded in 1989 and 1990. Real
growth has slowed down, private
investment has slowed to a freeze,
interest rates are severely represed,
and evidence of flight lrom he Naira
h loreign cunencies is manifest, as
market exchange rates continued to

government equity shares in upstream
oil ventures as the government did in
1989 (US$2 billion) and again in 1993

(US$500 million). These two sales
reduced he federal share in equitY
from 60 percentto 57.5 percent. By
lurher reducing its share to, say, 51
percent,

fie

depreciale faster than inllation.
Alltrese developmenb since 1990

Government could raise

can be traced to two fundamental
factors. First, there has been an un'
precedented surge in federal
government spending despite

between US$1 and US$2 billion,
depending upon he terms ofthe sale,
expected profit margins, and the level
ofoil reserves. These revenues could
be used to repay oubhnding anears

sustainable level. That will have to
include most subsidies and
subventions to public enterprises.
Second, new revenueswill need to be

raised. Third, diversions of revenues
should stop to ensure transparency
and accountability. Fourth, any
sustainable macroeconomic scenario
will require liberalization ol the foreign
exchange market. Fifth, a long{erm
solution to the external debt problem,

trrough an agreement with the Paris
Club would be a'key factor in assisting
the government's ellorb to revampthe
economy's long{erm growth potential,

but to secure a long{erm solution to
the external debt problem, a proven

commitment to fiscal discipline and
transparency is required. Finally,
additional linancing from the
inbrnational

fi

nancial community must

be secured, including from

he Bretton

Woods inslitutions, to close the gap.

to NNPC's loint venture partners,

dwindling revenues, which has been
tanslated into a massive liscal deficit.

Debt reliel and other external
financing for the medium term,

repay ohertypes of arrears, and help
meet a zero borrowing target.

Second, the exclusive reliance on
Central Bank credit to finance this

however, will only be forthcoming after

A solution to the external debt

deficit fueled a huge expansion of the
money supply. ln he period 1990 to

constaint is an essential ingredient of
a return

h

1993,

stability in Nigeria, both in

tre short and in the long run. Total
external debt service due in 1993,

his

loss of fiscal

contol has

been aggravated by a swge in extra-

budgetary expenditures and an
increase in tre diversion of revenues

excluding arrears, was the equivalent
to 14 percentof GDP atthe overvalued
official exchange rate, 18.8 percent at

oubide normal budgehry channels.
A restoration of macroeconomic

a credible track record has

been
established. ln turn, a successful

implementation of a medium'term
recovery programme would allow
these exceptional and temporarY
sources of financing to be replaced in
tre long term by private capital inllows
to fihance the investment and import

requirements for a fast growing
econ0my.

the Paris Club and other creditors
could achieve a reduction in the

stability will require more than a
control over
reassertion
expenditures by the government.

burden of external debt in a variety of

Given

he magnitude of the external
debt, and lirnited prospects {or
alternative sources of financing in he

lies in tre government's determination
to hckle the fiscal crisis, as well as in

durable solutions such as a reduction

medium term, the government will be

in the stock of debt outslanding.
Additional support in he form of new
loans fom tre international financial

required

allocate scarce resources more
effipiently than government can

he

parallel rate. An agreement

witt

ways, ranging from a series of
traditional rescheduling to more

community is also a possibility. The

prerequisite lor any such reliet.and
support, however, is a sustained and
|)

of

.

to keep its

non-debt

expenditures well wihin its revenues
{or, in other words, to generate a
primary surplus). First and foremost,

expenditures will need to be cut
sharply and brought down to a

Macroeconomic stability must be
restored for growth to resume. The key

ttre recognition that market forces will

commit.

